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Workers' Compensation
by IL Michael Bagley*
and J. Benson Ward"
The survey period from June 1, 2009 to May 31, 2010' was notable for
several decisions of the Georgia Court of Appeals in areas ranging from
temporary exacerbation of preexisting injury to choice of law. Minimal
legislation was enacted in these areas.
I. LEGISLATION
In relation to the Workers' Compensation Act,' the Georgia General
Assembly was relatively quiet in 2010. Although section 34-9-12(b) of
the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.)' was modified to
facilitate the publishing of board awards on specific cases,' the Selfinsurers Guaranty Trust Fund' was the essential focus of the General
Assembly's remaining legislation for 2010.6
The only other legislation of significance, and perhaps the most
controversial, was the General Assembly's modification of the Georgia

* Partner in the firm of Drew, Eckl & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory
University (BA., 1977); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 1980). Member, State
Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Drew, Eckl & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University
of Georgia (B.A., 2002); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 2005). Member, State
Bar of Georgia.
1. For analysis of Georgia workers' compensation law during the prior survey period,
see H. Michael Bagley & J. Benson Ward, Workers' Compensation, Annual Survey of
GeorgiaLaw, 61 MERCER L. REv. 399 (2009).
2. Ga. H.R. Bill 814, Reg. Seas., 1920 Ga. Laws 167 (codified at O.C.G.A. ch. 34-9 (2008
& Supp. 2010)).
3. O.C.G.A § 34-9-12(b) (2008 & Supp. 2010).
4. Ga. H.R. Bill 1101, § 1, Reg. Seas., 2010 Ga. Laws 126 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 34-912(b) (Supp. 2010)).
5. O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-380 to -389 (2008 & Supp. 2010).
6. See Ga. H.R. Bill 1101 at § 4,2010 Ga. Laws at 128 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-380
to -389 (Supp. 2010)).

383

384

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

Insurer's Insolvency Pool Act,7 which is likely to indirectly impact the
state workers' compensation system.' Prior to this legislation, the
Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool was not liable for any workers'
compensation claims incurred by captive insurance companies before
January 1, 2008. Likewise, the Insolvency Pool had the right to
recover from any employer who was an insured of an insolvent workers'
compensation insurer and whose net worth exceeded $25 million with all
amounts paid by the pool on behalf of the insured.o The 2010 legislation created a mechanism whereby these entities that were previously
barred from coverage by the Insolvency Pool could elect in certain
emergency circumstances to buy into the Insolvency Pool with the
payment of $10,000 for insureds with a net worth less than $25 million,
or $50,000 if the electing insured's net worth exceeds $25 million."
II.

COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT

The court of appeals dealt with the subject of idiopathic injuries for a
second year in a row during this survey period," and this year the
court held that an employee's injury did not arise in the course of her
employment,"a arguably limiting the reach of its prior decision in
Harrisv. Peach County Board of Commissioners' in the process. In St.
Joseph's Hospital v. Ward," the employee, a hospital nurse, asserted
four different accident dates for injuries to her knees, dating from 2003
through 2005. After a hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ)
found that the June 2005 right-knee ipjury was compensable. The
administrative record showed that the injury occurred on June 23, 2005,
when the employee entered a patient's room to administer medication
and twisted her right knee, experiencing a sudden pop, while turning
around to get the patient some water. On July 7, 2005, the employee
attempted to return to work after the injury but was unable to do so
because of right-knee pain. She remained out of work through August
2005 when she was offered a sit-and-greet position. She continued to

7. O.C.GA ch. 33-36 (2005).
8. See Ga. H.R. Bill 1364, Reg. Sess., 2010 Ga. Laws 1085 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 3336-11, -36-14, -36-20, -41-20.1 (Supp. 2010)).
9. O.C.G.A. § 33-41-20.1(b) (Supp. 2009).
10. O.C.G.A. § 33-36-14(dXl) (2005).
11. Ga. H.R. Bill 1364 at § 3,2010 Ga. Laws at 1087 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 33-36-20(c)
(Supp. 2010)).
12. For analysis of the subject of idiopathic injuries during the previous year, see supra
note 1, at 404-05.
13. St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Ward, 300 Ga. App. 845, 848, 686 S.E.2d 443, 445 (2009).
14. 296 Ga. App. 225, 674 S.E.2d 36 (2009).
15. 300 Ga. App. 845, 686 S.E.2d 443 (2009).
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work until September 2005 before leaving for a knee replacement. The
employee's doctor continued to hold her out of work following the

surgery.16
The AIJ also found sufficient evidence showing that in September
2005 the employee sustained a new, fictional accident when she was
unable to work because of a gradual worsening of her physical condition,
partially due to her continued work after her June 2005 injury." On
appeal, the Appellate Division of the Georgia State Board of Workers'
Compensation (SBWC) cited Chaparral Boats, Inc. v. Heath's in
concluding that the June 2005 "injury to her right knee was not
compensable 'as the employee was not exposed to any risk unique to her
employment by standing and turning, and that, in turning, she did not
come into contact with any object or hazard of employment.'" 9
In turn, the Superior Court of Richmond County, Georgia, concluded
that the court of appeals decision in the Chaparralcase was misconstrued by the appellate division because the employee's injury was a
direct result of the performance of her work duties (namely, assisting a
patient by turning to get a cup of water for the patient)." The superior
court held that "[ilnjuring her knee while turning to get a cup of water
for a patient is not a risk to which [the employee] would have been
equally exposed to apart from her employment."2' Thus, a causal
connection existed between the employee's injury and her employment
duties.2 2
The court of appeals noted that the crucial issue was whether the
employee proved "that her accidental injury arose out of her employment."' Explaining that it was following the holding in Chaparral,the
court concluded that employees who injure their knee while walking at
work cannot receive workers' compensation benefits for that injury
because they are engaged in an effort (that is, walking) that is a risk
they are equally exposed to apart from their employment.' In other
words, the employee's injury in St. Joseph's Hospital was idiopathic in

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
S.E.2d
24.

Id. at 846, 686 S.E.2d at 444.
Id.
269 Ga. App. 339, 606 S.E.2d 567 (2004).
St. Joseph's Hosp., 300 Ga. App. at 847, 686 S.E.2d at 444.
Id. at 847, 686 S.E.2d at 446.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
Id. at 848, 686 S.E.2d at 445 (quoting ChaparralBoats, 269 Ga. App. at 340, 606
at 569) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (quoting ChaparralBoats, 269 Ga. App. at 344, 606 S.E.2d at 572).
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that it was personal to the claimant and not the result of any risk
unique to her employment.5
The court noted that this result was harmonious with last year's
26
because in both decisions the court of appeals
decision in Harris
deferred to the appellate division's findings and the evidence that existed
to support such findings.' According to the court, any statements in
Harristhat could be construed to conflict with Chaparralare nonbinding
dicta."
III.

CHANGE IN CONDITION VS. NEw ACCIDENT: INTERVENING
EMPLOYMENT
29

In Ihucks, Inc. v. 'Rowell, the employee worked as a truck driver
for Trucks, Inc., and her duties included the manual hooking and
unhooking of trailers to tractor-trailer rigs as well as driving tractortrailer rigs to and from Florida. 'Ib manually hook and unhook the
trailers, the employee used a hand crank to roll down the trailers'
landing gear. On April 18, 2006, while using the hand crank, the
employee experienced a burning feeling in her right shoulder." The
employee "continued working at regular duty, but ... sought medical

She timely
treatment for pain in her neck and right shoulder."
as a
was
accepted
claim
the
and
the
incident,
of
notified her employer
compensable "medical-only" claim."
Within six months of the accident, the employee resigned due to a
work slowdown and began working as a truck driver for a different
employer, Trans Systems, Inc. (Trans Systems). Her new job duties
included using a manual gear shift but did not include using a hand
crank to raise and lower trailers. She worked for a little over a month
before quitting in December when work slowed down. The following
month, her treating doctor recommended surgery on her right shoulder
and advised the employee not to work until surgery was performed.
Because of her intervening employment with Trans Systems, Trucks,

25. See id
26. For the court of appeals decision and examination of the evidence in Harris,see 296
Ga. App. at 225-29, 231, 674 S.E.2d at 38-42.
27. St. Joseph's Hosp., 300 Ga. App. at 848 n.1, 686 S.E.2d at 445 n.1.
28. Id.
29. 302 Ga. App. 488, 690 S.E.2d 880 (2010).
30. Id. at 488-89, 690 S.E.2d at 881.
31. Id. at 489, 690 S.E.2d at 881.
32. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Inc. refused to pay for any further medical treatment or surgery. The
employee responded by filing a claim against Trucks, Inc.'
The ALJ found that the employee's medical condition was the result
of her April 18 injury and not due to a change in condition or new
accident, and the appellate division affirmed.' The Superior Court of
Cobb County, Georgia, affirmed as well but based its decision on the fact
that the employee "had proven a change in condition entitling her to
benefits."
The court of appeals determined that the superior court erred in
making its finding because the employee never previously received an
award of workers' compensation benefits under O.C.G.A. § 34-9104(a)(1)' for her job-related right-shoulder injury." Nonetheless,
the court of appeals affirmed the superior court's decision under the
right for any reason principle, stating that the evidence supported a
finding that the employee's disability was solely attributable to her
initial work-related injury, not to a gradual worsening of the injury
caused by her continued work." The court referred to the employee's
testimony that her problems persisted but did not increase during her
period of subsequent employment as well as to the treating physician's
testimony that the medical condition was caused by the initial incident.39
IV.

STATUTE OF LIMrlrloNs: CATASTROPHIC DESIGNATION

During the survey period, the court of appeals continued to clarify the
interplay between the statute of limitations, requests for change in
In Georgia Institute of
condition, and catastrophic designation.
Technology v. Hunnicutt,o the employee sustained a compensable
injury in May 1996 and received indemnity benefits for the maximum
400-week period available under the statute until February 2004. She
then filed a Request for Catastrophic Designation form, or WC-R1CATEE, in July 2005-within two years after last receiving benefits-but did
not specifically request further indemnity benefits anywhere on the WCR1CATEE form. The Managed Care and Rehabilitation Division of the
State Board designated her injury as catastrophic. She later filed a WC-

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 489-90, 690 S.E.2d at 881-82.
Id. at 490, 690 S.E.2d at 882.
Id. at 491, 690 S.E.2d at 882.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(aXl) (2008).
Trucks, 302 Ga. App. at 492, 690 S.E.2d at 883.
Id. at 492-94, 690 S.E.2d at 883-84.
Id. at 493, 690 S.E.2d at 884.
303 Ga. App. 536, 694 S.E.2d 190 (2010).

388

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

14 hearing request for indemnity benefits in December 2007, outside of
the O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(b) two-year time requirement.
The ALJ rejected the employer's argument that because the WCR1CATEE did not specifically request indemnity benefits, the employee
did not timely request benefits prior to the running of the two-year
statute of limitations. The appellate division and the Superior Court of
Fulton County, Georgia, affirmed. The only issue on appeal was
whether the employee's timely filing of her catastrophic designation
request constituted an application for additional indemnity benefits
under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(b).'
The court of appeals agreed with the lower courts, determining that
under the plain language of O.C.G.A §§ 34-9-104(b) and 34-9-261," the
request to designate the injury as "catastrophic" constituted an
application under § 34-9-104(b) for a decision based on a "change in
condition" that would, pursuant to § 34-9-261, "increas[e] or authoriz[e]
the recovery of ...

income benefits" greater than those she received

following her original injury." Thus, "because [the employee] filed her
request for catastrophic designation within two years of the date of the
last payment of her [temporary total disability (TTD)] income benefits,
her request was timely under [O.C.G.A.] § 34-9-104(b)."' 6 This decision
clarifies that in order to properly request indemnity benefits, it is
sufficient for an employee to file a WC-R1CATEE within two years of
last receiving indemnity benefits.'
In Kroger Co. v. Wilson," the employee sustained a compensable back
injury in 1994. He received TTD benefits while out of work and
temporary partial disability (TPD) benefits when performing light or
sedentary work. The employer paid benefits until the employee
exhausted the statutory maximum amount of weeks in September 2001.
The employee filed a WC-14 hearing request in August 2003 and
indicated that he was seeking temporary total and temporary partial
disability benefits to continue past September 2001, but he later

41. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(b) (2008).
42. Ga. Inst. of Tech., 303 Ga. App. at 537-38, 694 S.E.2d at 191-92.
43. Id. at 538, 694 S.E.2d at 192.
44. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-261 (2008).
45. Ga. Inst. of Tech., 303 Ga. App. at 539, 694 S.E.2d at 192 (alterations in original)
(quoting Williams v. Conagra Poultry, Inc., 295 Ga. App. 744, 745-46, 673 S.E.2d 105, 107
(2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. Id. at 539, 694 S.E.2d at 192-93.
47. Id. at 538-39, 694 S.E.2d at 192.
48. 301 Ga. App. 345, 687 S.E.2d 586 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0606, 2010 Ga.
LEXIS 341, at *1 (Ga. Apr. 19, 2010).
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withdrew the request and took no action on his claim.49 Upon the
advice of his physicians, the employee stopped working in May 2004.'
In April 2006 the employee filed a WC-R1CATEE requesting the
designation of his condition as catastrophic. Because the catastrophic
designation request constituted a change in status or condition request,
the AI determined that the employee's claim was time-barred under
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(b)'s two-year statute of limitations." The appellate
division reversed, and the Superior Court of Clayton County, Georgia,
affirmed the decision.
The court of appeals agreed that § 34-9-104(b) applied to the
employee's request and that he therefore had two years from the date of
his last income benefits payment to file a claim requesting catastrophic
designation. 2 The operative inquiry centered on whether the employee's 2003 hearing request constituted a request within the limitations
period." The employee argued that his 2003 request should have tolled
the statute of limitations because § 34-9-104(b) only requires a party to
apply for a change of condition within a two-year period of the party's
last benefits payment." However, the court concluded that because the
employee only indicated that he was seeking temporary disability
benefits in the WC-14 form, the form did not put the employer on notice
that he was seeking to designate his injury as catastrophic.' Additionally, the court reasoned that when the employee filed a WC-14 form
instead of a WC-R1CATEE form specifically designed for catastrophic
claims, this indicated that he was not seeking a catastrophic injury
designation in

2 0 0 3 ."

Thus, the court concluded the AIJ correctly

determined that the employee's claim was time-barred." This decision
clarifies that when an employee who seeks a catastrophic injury
designation files a WC-14 form requesting a hearing, the employee must
make the request for a catastrophic injury designation explicit so as to
put the employer on "notice of the specific issues [the employee] seeks to
litigate.""

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
68.

Id. at 345-46, 687 S.E.2d at 587.
Id. at 345, 687 S.E.2d at 587.
Id. at 346-47, 687 S.E.2d at 587-88.
Id. at 347, 687 S.E.2d at 588.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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V. INJURY BY ACCIDENT: TEMPORARY EXACERBATION OF PREEXISTING
CONDITIONS
9

In Big Lots v. Kiker,5 the employee obtained a June 2004 award
from the State Board after the Board found that she sustained a
compensable accidental injury to her back in July 2002 that aggravated
a preexisting back condition. Following a 2009 hearing, the ALJ
determined that according to medical evidence, the July 2002 injury was
no longer the reason for her back condition, and the present disability
was caused by the preexisting back condition. Based on the evidence,
the employee had experienced a change of condition for the better under
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4);' therefore, she was not entitled to medical
treatment. The appellate division adopted the ALJ's award.6 1
The Superior Court of Carroll County, Georgia, reversed the appellate
division, determining that a December 2005 consent order, which
changed the authorized treating physician, had the effect of rendering
res judicata that the injury continued to cause the back problems.
Additionally, the superior court stated that only evidence showing a
change in her condition after the consent order could be considered.
Further, the superior court found no evidence after the consent order
showing that the July 2002 injury had ceased and was no longer the
cause of the back injury.
The court of appeals noted that "[tlo establish that [the employee's]
condition changed for the better because her July 2002 injury resolved
[O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(a)] required proof of change occurring after the date
on which her physical condition as a result of the injury 'was last
established by award or otherwise."' The consent order from December 2005, which related to the authorized treating physician, did not
Thus, the court of
establish the employee's physical condition."
appeals held that the superior court erred by concluding that only
Instead, the
evidence after December 2005 could be considered.'
evidence showed that after the employee's condition from the July 2002
accident was established in the 2004 award, the injury was no longer the
Because the Board's findings
cause of the back-related disability.'

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

304 Ga. App. 190, 695 S.E.2d 710 (2010).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4) (2008).
Big Lots, 304 Ga. App. at 190, 695 S.E.2d at 710.
Id. at 191, 695 S.E.2d at 711.
Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(a) (2008).
Big Lots, 304 Ga. App. at 191, 695 S.E.2d at 711.
Id.
Id.
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were supported by competent evidence, they were binding on the
superior court."
VI. EXCLUSIVE REMEDY
In Sabellona v. Albert Painting,Inc.," the court of appeals sought to
harmonize two provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) that
appeared to have contradictory application. In Sabellona, an employee,
who worked for Labor Ready, was killed after falling through a skylight
at a Boral Bricks, Inc. plant. Boral had hired Albert Painting, Inc. (API)
to paint a building at its plant and subsequently contracted with Labor
Ready to supply temporary laborers for the job.69 According to the
agreements entered into by API and Labor Ready, Labor Ready charged
its regular billing rate per employee, per hour, including "all wages,
withholdings, FICA, Medicare, payroll taxes, unemployment insurance
and workers' compensation insurance.7 o At the time of his death, the
employee was a temporary employee supplied by Labor Ready to paint
the roofs at APrs plant."
Following his death, the employee's minor son filed a workers'
compensation claim against Labor Ready that settled for $160,000.
Subsequently, all three of the employee's children and his personal
representative fied a wrongful death claim against a host of defendants,
including Boral and API. The trial court granted API's motion for
summary judgment on the ground that it was immune from suit
pursuant to the exclusive remedy provision of the WCA. 72
The court of appeals noted the 1995 changes to the exclusive remedy
provision of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11,73 which extended tort immunity to
businesses that make use of the services offered by temporary help
contracting firms or employee leasing companies.7 Businesses can
receive this immunity "provided that workers' compensation benefits are
furnished by either: (1) a temporary help contracting firm or an
employee leasing company; or (2) a business using the services of either
such firm or company." Because Labor Ready qualified as a tempo-

67. Id.
68. 303 Ga. App. 842, 695 S.E.2d 307 (2010).
69. Id. at 842-43, 695 S.E.2d at 308.
70. Id. at 843, 695 S.E.2d at 308-09.
71. Id. at 843, 695 S.E.2d at 309.
72. Id. at 842, 695 S.E.2d at 308.
73. Ga. H.R. Bill 272, Reg. Sess., 1995 Ga. Laws 352 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A.
* 34-9-11 (2008)).
74. Id. at § 1, 1995 Ga. Laws at 353; Sabellona,303 Ga. App. at 843,695 S.E.2d at 309.
75. Sabellona, 303 Ga. App. at 843, 695 S.E.2d at 309.
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rary help contracting firm, and API qualified as a business using Labor
Ready's services, API was immune from suit under O.C.G.A. § 34-911(c)."7
Applying the language of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-2(a)(2)," the appellants
also contended that the WCA did not apply to API because API regularly
had fewer than three employees in service. In response, API argued that
by contracting with Labor Ready, it elected to be bound by the WCA
The court agreed, stating that even though API had
voluntarily.
fewer than three employees, API agreed to the terms of its contract and
agreement with Labor Ready to pay a rate for temporary employees that
included coverage for workers' compensation benefits.7 9 Thus, API
voluntarily agreed to be subject to the WCA."
The case of Clarke v. Freemane"arose "from the events of March 11,
2005, when Brian Nichols escaped from Fulton County deputies while
awaiting trial at the Fulton County Courthouse and killed several
individuals ...

before surrendering" the next day.'

The plaintiffs

worked as case manager and assistant case manager to Judge Rowland
The
Barnes, whom Nichols shot and killed during the incident.'
plaintiffs brought suit against Fulton County Sheriff Myron Freeman,
among others, for damages arising out of assault, false imprisonment,
and infliction of emotional distress.'
The trial court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss the
complaints, which alleged that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.' The court of appeals reversed, stating
that the appellants had in fact "alleged sufficient facts that, if proven,
could sustain a finding that the foreseeable result of the defendants'
negligence was Nichols's violence against [the] Judge ...

and his

staff."
One of the defendants argued that the dismissal was proper on the
basis that the plaintiffs' exclusive remedy was via the WCA.17 However, the court of appeals concluded that dismissal on the basis of the

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-2(aX2) (2008).
Sabellona, 303 Ga. App. at 843-44, 695 S.E.2d at 309.
Id.
Id. at 844, 695 S.E.2d at 309.
302 Ga. App. 831, 692 S.E.2d 80 (2010).
Id. at 831-32, 692 S.E.2d at 82.
Id. at 832, 692 S.E.2d at 82.
Id at 832, 835, 692 S.E.2d at 82, 84.
Id. at 835, 692 S.E.2d at 84.
Id. at 837, 692 S.E.2d at 85-86.
Id. at 837-38, 692 S.E.2d at 86.
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exclusivity provision would be premature at that juncture in the
proceedings." The court of appeals noted the trial court's conclusion
in its dismissal order that a special duty was owed by the defendants to
the plaintiffs' decedent, but the court of appeals dismissed this argument
because no one had provided it with a copy of the order.' The court
also noted, moreover, that the plaintiffs did not allege physical injuries
in their complaints, without which the plaintiffs could not bring the
alleged psychological injury within the purview of the WCA."
VII.

SUBROGATION: CONFLICTS OF LAW

In Performance Food Group, Inc. v. Williams," the employee, a
Tennessee resident, was injured in a car wreck while driving a
Performance Food tractor-trailer in Gwinnett County, Georgia. The
employer paid benefits under Tennessee's workers' compensation law,
and in an effort to recover for the medical and indemnity benefits that
it paid, the employer subsequently brought an action in Georgia against
the owner and driver of the vehicle responsible for the wreck. The trial
court granted summary judgment for the defendants because the
employer's subrogation rights under Tennessee law were precluded by
Georgia law."
The court of appeals explained that in Georgia, conflicts of law rules
require courts to look to the state where the last act completing the tort
occured to determine the substantive law that applies.' Although the
employee was a nonresident and was hired by a foreign corporation,
because the employee was injured in Georgia, Georgia law applied
regardless of whether Georgia workers' compensation law was invoked
to pay benefits." Therefore, because the injury occurred in Georgia
and the employee was eligible for workers' compensation benefits in
Georgia, Georgia law governed the employer's subrogation claim."

88. Id. at 838, 692 S.E.2d at 86.
89. Id.; see Pardue v. Ruiz, 263 Ga. 146, 148, 429 8.E.2d 912, 914 (1993).
90. Clarke, 302 Ga. App. at 837-38,692 S.E.2d at 85-86; see Betts v. Medcross Imaging
Ctr., Inc., 246 Ga. App. 873, 874, 542 S.E.2d 611, 614 (2000) ("Paychological injury, not
preceded by or accompanied by physical injury, is not compensable under the Workers'
Compensation Act.).
91. 300 Ga. App. 831, 686 S.E.2d 437 (2009).
92. Id. at 832-33, 686 S.E.2d at 439-40.
93. Id. at 832, 686 S.E.2d at 440.
94. Id. at 832,686 S.E.2d at 439 (quoting Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roark, 297 Ga. App.
612, 614, 677 S.E.2d 786, 788 (2009)).
95. Id. at 833, 686 S.E.2d at 439.
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In Georgia O.C.GA. § 34-9-11.1' governs subrogation for workers'
compensation benefits.' The court explained that pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1(b), the subrogation rights of an employer or insurer are
limited to the benefits paid under the Georgia WCA." Thus, the court
held that the employer could not pursue a subrogation claim for benefits
paid under foreign law." While the application of lex loci delicti may
appear harsh to employers, the court observed there is no inherent right
to subrogation in Georgia, and lex loci delicti does not deprive employers
of due process."oo

VIII. JUDICIAL REVIEW
During the survey period, the court of appeals dealt with a number of
cases that concerned the proper standard or scope of appellate review.
In Home Depot v. Pettigrew,'0 the employee twisted her ankle while
working in 2003 and underwent medical treatment, including surgery.on She "also began experiencing back problems which ... her
treating physician attributed to the changes in her gait as a result of the
ankle injury."
The employee ultimately filed a request to designate
her injury as catastrophic, and a hearing was held on the issue."o
Following the hearing, the ALJ issued an order that designated the
ankle injury as catastrophic under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200.1(g)(6)'" but
found the employee's back problems to be degenerative and not a result
of the ankle injury. The employee appealed, contending that the
treating physician found the back pain resulted from the ankle injury
and also that the employer never controverted that finding nor added
the issue of compensability for the injury to its hearing request.'06

96. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1 (2008).
97. PerformanceFood Grp., 300 Ga. App. at 833,686 S.E.2d at 439; see O.C.G.A. § 349-11.1.
98. PerformanceFood Grp., 300 Ga. App. at 833,686 S.E.2d at 439 (quoting Johnson
v. Comcar Indus., Inc., 252 Ga. App. 625, 626, 556 S.E.2d 148, 150 (2001)).
99. Id. at 833-34, 686 S.E.2d at 439-40.
100. Id. at 833-34,686 S.E.2d at 440 (quoting Dowis v. Mud Slingers, 279 Ga. 808,816,
621 S.E.2d 413,419 (2005)) (citing K-Mart Apparel Corp. v. Temples, 260 Ga. 871,872,401
S.E.2d 5, 6 (1991) (finding that an employer or insurer does not have a constitutionally
protected interest in money it receives from a third-party tortfeasor)).
101. 298 Ga. App. 501, 680 S.E.2d 450 (2009).
102. Id. at 502, 680 S.E.2d at 451.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200.1(gX6) (2008).
106. Home Depot, 298 Ga. App. at 502, 680 S.E.2d at 451.
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The appellate division concluded that the employee herself raised the
issue regarding the compensability of her back problem when she
requested the catastrophic designation, and it determined that both
parties had an opportunity to present medical evidence regarding the
causation of the back problems. The Superior Court of Houston County,
Georgia, struck the factual finding that the employee's back problems
were not a compensable injury; the issue was not properly before the
ALJ because the employee received neither notice nor an opportunity to
be heard on the issue.o"
The court of appeals agreed that the superior court properly "determined that the issue of whether [the employee's] back injury was
compensable was not properly before the ALJ or the [alppellate
[dlivision."'"

The employee marked nothing on the form for cata-

strophic designation that would suggest she thought the compensability
of her back or ankle problems was at issue, and nothing in the hearing
transcript suggested that either party believed compensability to be an
issue.'
Thus, as a matter of law, the ALT erred in making factual
findings on the compensability issue because no evidence supported that
the employee had notice and an opportunity to be heard "or gave implied
consent to trial of that issue.""xo However, the court of appeals also
ruled that the superior court did not have the authority to strike the
AI's finding."' Instead, the appropriate procedure for the superior
court would have been to remand to the State Board for a hearing on the
issue." 2 "Because the superior court did not do so, [the court of
appeals] vacat[ed] its order and remand[ed] with instruction that the
case be recommitted to the State Board ...

for a further evidentiary

hearing" on the issue of whether the back injury was compensable."s

A.

JudicialReview: Appeals

Strickland v. Crossmark, Inc."' arose from an August 15, 2008,
incident in which the employee allegedly injured her back while stocking
shelves. The employer voluntarily paid temporary total disability (TTD)
benefits following the accident and then controverted the claim."'

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id. at 503, 680 S.E.2d at 452.
Id. at 503-04, 680 S.E.2d at 452.
Id. at 504, 680 S.E.2d at 458.
Id.
Id. at 505, 680 S.E.2d at 453.
Id.
298 Ga. App. 568, 680 S.E.2d 606 (2009).
Id. at 569-70, 680 S.E.2d at 607-08.
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Following a hearing, the ALJ denied the claim after finding that the
employee failed to show that she sustained a compensable injury. 16
The employee appealed the AL's decision, and on appeal before the
appellate division, she contended for the first time that the employer's
notice to controvert was invalid. According to the employee, the
employer violated O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221(h)"' and Board Rule 221118
when the employer voluntarily began paying benefits and failed to pay
her all compensation due when its notice was given.'19 '[Tihe Appellate Division vacated the decision of the ALJ and remanded for
additional proceedings as to the validity of the notice to controvert." 20
The employer then appealed to the Superior Court of Lowndes County,
Georgia, which reversed the appellate division and remanded with
direction that it only review those issues that were raised before the ALJ

at the hearing.121
The court of appeals determined that the appellate division's order,
which vacated the AL's award and remanded to the ALT for additional
proceedings on the notice issue, was not a final award.'2 Consequently, the superior court heard an interlocutory appeal, but interlocutory
appeals are not authorized under the WCA.12 8 Thus, the superior
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the court of appeals
reversed the superior court.2"

B. Judicial Review: Attorney Fees
The court of appeals delved into the issue of attorney fees in Flores v.
Keener." In that case, the court examined a situation in which the
employee switched attorneys immediately before settlement, resulting in
the two attorneys for the employee fighting over apportionment of
Ultimately, the question turned
attorney fees from the settlement.'
on the issue of the superior court's standard of review."

116. Id. at 568, 680 S.E.2d at 607.
117. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221(h) (2008).
118. GEORGIA STATE BOARD OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION RuLE 221.
119. Strickland, 298 Ga. App. at 568-69, 680 S.E.2d at 607.
120. Id. at 569, 680 S.E.2d at 607.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 571, 680 S.E.2d at 608.
123. Id. at 570-71, 680 S.E.2d at 608 (citing GAC, MFG/Processing v. Busbin, 233 Ga.
App. 406, 406, 504 S.E.2d 270, 271 (1998)) ("[The] superior court lacked jurisdiction to
review Board's order remanding case to AI.").
124. Id.
125. 302 Ga. App. 275, 690 S.E.2d 903 (2010).
126. See id.
127. Id. at 275-76, 690 S.E.2d at 904.
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In Flores the employee first hired Russell Keener on October 14, 2005,
to represent him in a workers' compensation claim.12
In the contingent fee contract, [the employee] agreed to pay Keener 25
percent "of any recovery" or, in the event [he] dismissed Keener, a fee
"based upon time devoted to [his] case at [a] reasonabl[el hourly rate"
or 25 percent "of any offers which have been made by any adversary or
collateral party, whichever is greater.""n
After litigating for twenty months, the employer offered $650,000 to
settle, which the employee rejected. The employee then dismissed
Keener, who subsequently fied a lien for a $162,500 legal fee (25% of
the settlement offer) as well as accrued expenses."o
The same day he dismissed Keener, the employee hired Flores and
signed a contingent fee contract, agreeing to pay Flores 25% of any
monetary recovery payable to the employee under the WCA, whether
previously accrued or accrued in the future. Eight days after Flores was
hired, the employee accepted a settlement of $657,500. The parties
stipulated that the correct amount for attorney fees was $162,875 and
agreed that the fee should be held in escrow until Keener's lien was
resolved.'
The ALJ concluded "that a reasonable apportionment of the total fee
of $162,875 was 98.8 percent for Keener and 1.2 percent for Flores,"
percentages which represented the respective lengths of representation
by each attorney.3 s The appellate division determined the AL's
calculation of the relative values of the attorneys' services was not
shown in the record by a preponderance of credible evidence. Based on
the record, including Keener's hourly rate and the amount of work he
did on the case, the appellate division determined Keener was entitled
to 70% of the apportioned attorney fees, leaving the remaining 30% for
Flores. The Superior Court of Bartow County, Georgia, vacated the
judgment on the ground that the appellate division failed to apply the
correct legal standard and remanded with direction to apply the correct
standard."s
The court of appeals held that the superior court erred in concluding
that the appellate division committed an error in how it exercised
discretion to allocate the fee between the two attorneys."
Because
128. Id. at 276, 690 S.E.2d at 905.
129. Id. (fourth and fifth alteration in original).
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

276-77, 690 S.E.2d at 905.
277, 690 S.E.2d at 905.
275, 277, 690 S.E.2d at 904, 906.
279-80, 690 S.E.2d at 907.
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Flores did not show any reason under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(c)'6 for
vacating the appellate division's award while before the superior court,
the court of appeals reinstated the award."a

D. AUTHORIZED TREATMENT: ATENDANT CARE SERVICES
In Medical Office Management v. Hardee,"' the employee sustained
significant memory loss and dizziness after she was struck in the head
with a cash box during a robbery. Three of her medical providers
recommended that she receive at-home attendant care services for eight
hours per day, seven days per week, as workers' compensation benefits.
Following her injury, the employee's husband provided the attendant
care services that her medical providers recommended she receive. The
employee requested a hearing to determine whether the employer was
required to provide the services of a professional attendant care agency,
whether her husband was entitled to reimbursement for the care he
provided, and whether the employer was liable for attorney fees. The
ALJ determined that the employee was entitled to attendant care but
that the husband was not entitled to reimbursement, and the ALJ
denied the request for attorney fees."a
The appellate division agreed that the employee was entitled to
attendant care, but it also determined that the husband was entitled to
reimbursement for the care he provided and awarded $5,000 in attorney
fees for the employee's attorney. The Superior Court of Glynn County,
Georgia, affirmed but reversed as to the amount of attorney fees,
increasing the amount to $12,500. The employer appealed, arguing that
under Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Wilbanks,'19 the husband was
barred from recovering for the services he provided." In Bituminous
the court of appeals determined that the ordinary services of a wife to
her husband after his return from a hospital did not constitute
compensable treatment under the then applicable workers' compensation
law.141
The court noted that the WCA does not contain an express prohibition
against an employee's recovering for the attendant care services provided

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
918).

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(c) (2008).
Flores, 302 Ga. App. at 280, 690 S.E.2d at 907.
303 Ga. App. 60, 693 S.E.2d 103 (2010).
Id. at 61-62, 693 S.E.2d at 105.
60 Ga. App. 620, 4 S.E.2d 916 (1939).
Hardee, 303 Ga. App. at 62-63, 693 S.E.2d at 105-06.
Id. at 63, 693 S.E.2d at 106 (quoting Bituminous, 60 Ga. App. at 622, 4 S.E.2d at
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by the employee's family, including care by a spouse. 142 The court also
explained that the fee schedule contemplated home health care
reimbursement for services given by family members." Ultimately,
the court held that its decision in Bituminous had been superceded by
changes in both workers' compensation and domestic law.'"
Specifically, the court discussed the changes to the WCA since 1939
when Bituminous was decided, including a requirement that employers
furnish employees with those treatments and services that are prescribed by licensed physicians." Based on that requirement, the court
concluded that the change to the WCA expanded benefits to include athome, nonmedical attendant care services.'" While the court noted
that the husband could be expected to care for his suffering wife, he was
not legally required to provide the medically prescribed care."
Moreover, he provided medically prescribed services that the employer
previously refused to give." Therefore, the court concluded that he
was entitled to reimbursement for the at-home attendant care services
he provided."
The court then addressed the employer's arguments against assessed
attorney fees, upholding the award of fees but reversing the superior
court on its increase of the amount.'" Because there was uncontroverted medical evidence as to the need for attendant care, evidence
existed to support the appellate division's determination of attorney
fees.' However, the superior court erred in substituting itself as the
fact-finding body and should have affirmed the appellate division's
findings if any evidence existed to support them.'
Therefore, the
court of appeals reversed that portion of the judgment and assessed
$5000 in attorney fees against the employer. 53

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 64, 693 S.E.2d at 107.
145. Id. at 63-64, 693 S.E.2d at 106-07; see also O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200(a) (2008).
146. Hardee, 303 Ga. App. at 64, 693 S.E.2d at 107.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 65, 693 S.E.2d at 108.
150. Id. at 65, 67-68, 693 S.E.2d at 108-09.
151. Id. at 66, 693 S.E.2d at 108.
152. Id. at 67-68, 693 S.E.2d at 109 (quoting Korner v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., 281 Ga.
App. 322, 324, 635 S.E.2d 892, 894 (2006)).
153. See id.
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